Shirking and Remaining Years on Players’ Contracts in Major League Baseball by Tizard, Henry
Skidmore College
Creative Matter
Economics Student Theses and Capstone Projects Economics
2018
Shirking and Remaining Years on Players’
Contracts in Major League Baseball
Henry Tizard
Skidmore College, htizard@skidmore.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/econ_studt_schol
Part of the Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Creative Matter. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Student
Theses and Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of Creative Matter. For more information, please contact jluo@skidmore.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tizard, Henry, "Shirking and Remaining Years on Players’ Contracts in Major League Baseball" (2018). Economics Student Theses and
Capstone Projects. 75.
https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/econ_studt_schol/75
 1 
 
 
 
 
Shirking and Remaining Years on Players’ Contracts in Major League Baseball 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Student Researcher: Henry Tizard 
Faculty Sponsor: Professor Monica Das 
May 1st, 2018 
This thesis was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the course 
Senior Seminar (EC375), during the Spring semester of 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Abstract 
 This undergraduate economics thesis is meant to find statistically significant 
evidence for shirking behavior in Major League Baseball (MLB). Theory suggests 
that players shirk on effort when they have recently signed a long-term lucrative 
contract, since there is little incentive to compete when money is guaranteed to the 
player regardless of current performance. It is particularly important to understand 
the MLB labor market, since the firms giving out contracts not only have a copious 
amount of production information regarding their employees, but this data is widely 
available to the general public. This study will make use of modern sabermetric 
statistics in order to further open up the conversation regarding shirking with 
advanced statistics. It will also seek to control for other motivational forces at play, 
such as intrinsic motivation of the player based on their own self-confidence, as well 
as extrinsic motivation regarding the performance of the time in terms of win-loss 
record. Such motivational factors had not yet been discussed within the shirking 
conversation. 
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Introduction 
 Do Major League Baseball (MLB) players exhibit less effort when they have 
many years left on their contract? The MLB labor market is set up in such a way that 
after signing a long-term contract, players really have no reason to play except to 
earn their next contract. Does this mean that players will only exhibit maximal effort 
as their contract nears expiration? Research regarding shirking behavior informs 
economists regarding human behavior. Evidence of shirking would imply that 
intrinsic motivation is not strong, and that the worker is entirely incentivized by 
money.  
 Other articles regarding shirking behavior, such as those by renowned sports 
economist Anthony Krautmann, set out on numerous occasions to see whether or 
not shirking behavior can truly be empirically proven. Unfortunately, different 
models seem to find differing results, depending on the theoretical framework 
behind the model, the performance measures used, and the type of contracts 
included within the sample.  
 This study will seek to be the first to control for intrinsic motivation in the 
context of testing for shirking behavior in Major League Baseball. Effort is a direct 
result of motivation, so this article contains multiple regression models that include 
other motivating or demotivating controls in order to isolate the effect of the years 
remaining on a player’s contract and that player’s performance.  
 The model that this thesis presents brings experimentation and innovation to 
the literature. This article also is the first to use the sabermetric statistic Wins Above 
Replacement (WAR) as the performance variable. This makes this thesis unique in 
that no other paper uses a performance measure that can compare pitchers and 
hitters. 
 Unfortunately, the models created in this study had differing results, and 
shirking behavior based on contract years remaining remains empirically unproven. 
Differing performance measures yielded different results, which was consistent 
with other articles in the literature. More studies need to be conducted in order to 
understand the WAR statistic better, as well as to establish regular measures of 
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forces of motivation competing with the incentive-based motivation, such as 
extrinsic and intrinsic. 
 The next section will provide a comprehensive literature review of shirking 
behavior. Then, the next section will go over the framework for the first model. The 
third section will analyze the model. The fourth section will introduce a similar 
model with very slight adjustments, then compare the models. The fifth section will 
do this once more, slightly adjusting the model and discussing differences. The final 
section is a brief conclusion to sum up the thoughts, opinions, and lessons that the 
thesis provides. 
 
Literature Review 
 Sports are unique. They are among the only markets in which it is 
straightforward to quantify an individual’s productivity. In addition, labor contracts 
are structured in such a way where players often known almost exactly what they 
are going to be paid, regardless of current performance. Rather, contracts are 
negotiated based on past performance, and teams must commit guaranteed money 
to players based on projections for the future. When it is put so simply, it seems 
obvious that teams should commit more money and years to superior players. This 
is how the market has functioned. However, this creates a classic principle-agent 
dilemma, in which players function as the agents, and team owners function as 
principles (Pedicelli, 2015). Once owners or executives elect to sign a player to a 
long-term contract, that player no longer has an incentive to exhibit maximum effort 
(assuming that exerting effort is unpleasant). Take the case of Pablo Sandoval, for 
instance. Sandoval was an accomplished player and a playoff hero for the San 
Francisco Giants, but after signing a 5-year, $90 million contract with the Boston 
Red Sox after the 2014 season, he was consistently overweight, out of shape, and an 
underperformer for the Red Sox. He was released by the Red Sox after two and a 
half disappointing seasons, but he is still being paid by the team. This extreme 
example exemplifies the importance of evaluating contract structures in the Major 
League Baseball (MLB) labor market. Could such a circumstance been avoided? Is 
there a pattern of reduced effort after the signing of a long-term contract? Sports 
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economists have studied this idea of “shirking”, or making the decision to exhibit 
less effort under certain circumstances. This paper will extensively analyze and 
critique the existing literature on this subject to provide context for my own model 
for analyzing the controversial relationship between effort and incentives in 
professional sports. 
 A fundamental problem that arises in principle-agent relationships, outlined 
by Holmstrem (1979), is the imperfect information that principles have to deal with 
when designing contracts for agents. As a result, employers are expected to invest 
capital into monitoring the actions of their employees in order to get a stronger 
sense of individual production and to ultimately use this information to create a 
labor contract (Holmstrem, 1979). Sports, specifically Major League Baseball due to 
their advanced statistical measures of performance, are the finest example of this 
performance monitoring, analysis, and subsequent action based on this information. 
Investing as much capital as is efficient into performance monitoring is described as 
a second-best solution to perfect information (Holmsrem, 1979). This behavior can 
easily be observed in Major League Baseball, as advances in analytics are at the 
forefront of public attention, largely beginning by the "Moneyball" approach most 
famously used by Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics in the late 1990's, which has 
since been used across the league. Although complete monitoring has not yet been 
achieved, Major League Baseball owners and executives continually strive towards 
this ideal. This makes the MLB and other sports labor markets unique. Unlike most 
firms, who are unable to invest capital heavily into monitoring, since it is so 
prohibitively expensive, MLB franchises have copious amounts of money to monitor 
and scout players in order to optimize labor contracts. When it comes to monitoring 
players, all of whom make six, seven, eight, or even nine figures, investing into this 
function is not only important, it is absolutely necessary to the success of a 
franchise. Holmstrem (1979) would anticipate that near perfect monitoring would 
result in contracts that actually penalize dysfunctional behavior (Holmstrem, 1979). 
However, incentive based contracts are only starting to become popular recently, 
and contracts that penalize poor performance do not exist. This could be due to the 
power of the MLB Players Association. The unique amount of information in 
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baseball specifically makes it an important market to understand. As technology, as 
well as statistical power to predict and value continue to improve, monitoring 
similar to that in baseball will likely become to the norm in other labor markets as 
well, so the evolution of labor contracts in baseball could serve as a framework for 
future contracts in other labor sectors. 
 In order to set the context for discussing this market inefficiency, it is 
important to understand where the MLB labor market is in its evolution. Before free 
agency, players had no choice but to sign contracts under the reserve clause system. 
This reserve clause was in every contract, and it allowed the owner of the team to 
renew a player’s contract after the previous contract expires indefinitely (Knowles 
et al. 2003).  
The advent of free agency brought about a shift in the balance of risk sharing. 
As opposed to the team having the right to continue to renew the existing contract 
of the player, free agency makes it so that teams usually do not have this 
opportunity to opt out of future payments, unless of course this provision exists 
within the contract. Essentially, the player is provided with assurance that he is 
going to paid, and thus it can be inferred that this player will demonstrate moral 
hazard.  
 Obviously, due to the long-term contract situation stated above, there is an 
inefficiency inherent in the labor market. Luckily for MLB teams, players like to play, 
and there is strong intrinsic motivation within players. If there was not, then 
Giancarlo Stanton could have stopped exhibiting effort purposely after signing his 
contract worth over three hundred million dollars, and the Marlins would have had 
absolutely no option but to pay the man lazily sat on the bench, producing nothing 
for the franchise, because he simply does not have to. This type of contract structure 
would fail outright in just about any other type of business. Therefore, there must be 
other forces, such as intrinsic motivation that make this inefficiency difficult to 
prove econometrically. These forces must be controlled for in order to isolate the 
inefficiency. 
 Anthony Krautmann, who writes extensively on the subject of shirking in 
Major League Baseball, and John L. Solow created a study that measures changes in 
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performance over the course of long-term contracts (Krautmann and Solow, 2009). 
In the introduction, they state that there are many reasons to be skeptical about 
whether athletes shirk (Krautmann and Solow, 2009). This is undoubtedly true. The 
main argument he brings up is, however, not an argument. They ask why owners 
continue to offer long-term contracts if there are perverse incentives. "Theory 
suggests that incentive-compatible contracts should evolve to punish opportunistic 
behavior" (Krautmann and Solow, 2009). In this statement, Krautmann and Solow 
fail to acknowledge that we are not indeed in the long run. Free agency has only 
existed for fifty years in the MLB, and in that time, contracts have changed 
significantly, but the information-gathering phase is far from complete. Theories 
often assert that there is a long-run equilibrium that we trend towards, but in this 
case, the long-run equilibrium or trend, perfect information, is impossible to 
achieve. To ever assume that the market has already achieved long-run equilibrium 
status is a lofty assumption, and in this case, it is actually impossible, since no one 
knows what a player will contribute at the time that the team official and the player 
agree to the terms of the contract, given the current contract structure in which 
salaries are determined before performance. Perhaps contracts will evolve to 
punish opportunistic behavior more effectively, but the mere fact that they have not 
yet is not an argument that disputes the phenomenon. 
This faulty assumption is important for the actual model itself in that the 
model does not control for other motivational factors that guide the athlete to not 
shirk (or to shirk). As stated previously, the contract structure undoubtedly does, 
theoretically, leave athletes in a situation in which they do not need to exert 
unpleasant effort to make large sums of money. This idea needs to be isolated in 
order to be proven empirically. Other factors, such as intrinsic motivational factors, 
such as gaining fan support, winning a world series, earning the respect of 
teammates and the media, etc. are not considered in the model and thus cause it to 
be biased. 
 Faulty assumptions aside, it is time to analyze the model for what it is. The 
model is centralized around the idea that there is evidence of shirking when actual 
performance deviates significantly below expected performance. The model tests 
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for changes in expected adjusted OPS and actual adjusted OPS (adjusted OPS is 
simply a common sabermetric statistic used to evaluate the production of hitters) 
over the course of long-term contracts. Note that this does not include pitchers. The 
model executes this test in multiple steps. They first estimate the relationship 
between performance and experience in order to create expectations for how a 
player will perform when they exert maximum effort. They only consider players in 
their walk year in order to avoid a bias, as they assume that players not in their walk 
year will not exert maximal effort due to their hypothesis (Krautmann and Solow, 
2009). They also necessarily used a vector of various controls. Next, they calculated 
the players’ shirk value as the difference between expected and actual performance 
(Krautmann and Solow, 2009). Moving right along, they then estimate the 
probability that the current contract is the player’s last (Krautmann and Solow, 
2009). This contrasts with other models that only look at the ex post result of 
retirement. This idea is better because the player has not necessarily made the 
decision to retire in the middle of the season, but they are certainly aware of the 
likelihood that they make this decision in the future. This is one of the particularly 
brilliant aspects of the paper. Lastly, they estimate the relationship between the 
shirk variable and the amount of years remaining on the player’s contract to 
ultimately acquire their results (Krautmann and Solow, 2009). 
 The results assert that players who have a high probability of retiring at the 
conclusion of the contract exhibit less effort (Krautmann and Solow, 2009). They 
also found that players in their walk years play better than their projections 
(Krautmann and Solow, 2009). They also found that the coefficient of the years 
remaining variable was positive and significant, showing that players do in fact 
exert more effort when they have less time left on their contracts. Overall, this is a 
highly complex, successful model, one that sets the standard for all over models 
based on shirking behavior in Major League Baseball. 
 Another model involving Krautmann, this time in tandem with Donley, 
looked at shirking through two different definitions of productivity. One of them 
was of course marginal physical product, focusing on what the player is able to 
provide in terms of production on the field (Krautmann and Donley, 2009). The 
 9 
other model within the study was centered on marginal revenue product. The one 
using marginal physical product also used OPS, but the projections were formed 
using production from the prior three years, which obviously differs from the 
projection process in the model already discussed. This model yielded results that 
were not statistically significant (Krautmann and Donley, 2009). Unfortunately, the 
authors provide no possible explanations as to why this may be, especially since 
Krautmann was involved in the paper discussed above that did find statistically 
significant results. Unfortunately, he offers no comparisons. The performance 
measure differs between the two studies very slightly, as the former study utilizes a 
more advanced sabermetric statistic called adjusted OPS, whereas this one uses the 
normal OPS statistic that has been around for over a hundred years. Perhaps a 
reason for this is the lack of a variable controlling for the player’s retirement 
probability. A potential problem with this model is that it uses a simple control for 
age, as a linear relationship between age and performance is not likely to exist in 
linear form, as there is more likely to have a parabolic relationship between these 
variables. Therefore, functional form may be a problem throwing the results off. 
Another potential problem with the model is that the three years prior to the 
signing of a new contract may be biased downwards, as those years immediately 
preceding a contract carry high incentive to perform to maximum potential. This 
potential problem was discussed in the previous paper, but not this one. It is also 
not the cause of the insignificant coefficient values, since one would expect that bias 
to be in the direction that would favor more significant results 
 The model using marginal revenue product as the value standard brings an 
interesting twist to the literature. Marginal revenue product refers to the amount of 
revenue that a player generates. Expected marginal revenue product is logically 
assumed to be the negotiated salary for the player due to free-market bidding, while 
actual marginal revenue product requires calculation. They did so by estimating the 
team’s run differential (runs scored minus runs allowed), then using this to estimate 
a quadratic revenue function. Using this approach, the authors were able to find 
significant results (Krautmann, 1990). The author offered numerous explanations as 
to why this may be the case, such as synergies between players and teams that 
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consistently overpay. More research needs to be done in order to validate these 
explanations. In my opinion, the expected marginal revenue product being equal to 
the salary is true, but assuming that these expectations being realistic and accurate 
is difficult. These expectations should logically shift as more data is acquired, but 
contract structures do not allow for these shifts to be reflected in the model. In 
actuality, outlooks on players can shift within a year or two, so in the context of 
long-term contracts, which often exceed four years, these expectations are 
incredibly dated. Also, this assumption is faulty in that teams tend to structure 
contracts so that the salary is “back loaded”. There are numerous reasons that teams 
back load contracts, such as acquiring the player in their prime for less than they are 
worth, allowing the team to have more current money to spend on other players, as 
well as assuming higher future revenues and lower luxury tax limits, etc. The fact of 
the matter is that team’s pay players more than they expect them to be worth at the 
end of the contract, so this could inflate the shirk variable for the end of contracts 
that are back loaded. 
Another article brings up the randomness of production in professional 
sports. Krautmann offers an explanation dispelling the lack of incentive hypothesis 
centered around the randomness of productivity in professional baseball. It is clear 
that there is some degree of randomness and luck involved (Krautmann, 1990), but 
this explanation does not sit particularly well. This is especially true in a sport like 
baseball, where the sample size is normally around 162 games (a full season) and 
around 600 plate appearances, a large sample size as opposed to say football, which 
has only 16 game seasons.  
 In the conclusion, Krautmann cites the complexity of contracts as a reason 
that the disincentive problem does not exist without providing a theoretical basis 
for this claim (Krautmann, 1990). What complexity is he referring to? He fails to 
provide any sort of examples of how certain provisions may cancel out the 
disincentive problem. He may be referring to team or player options to opt out of 
the contract, but one could easily leave these contracts out of the sample. He may 
also be referring to incentive bonuses that are becoming more and more prevalent 
in contracts. However, these incentives, in almost all cases, only represent a 
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relatively small percentage of the overall value of the contract. Again, these are easy 
to keep out of the sample. 
 A response by Scoggins points out a very valid and distinct problem with this 
Krautmann article. Scoggins decided to run the exact same regression, except 
altering the performance measure ever so slightly, from slugging average to total 
bases (Scoggins, 1993). Slugging average is simply total bases per at-bat, so I must 
stress how small of a change that this is to the original regression model (Scoggins, 
1993). This miniscule change allowed Scoggins to reject the null hypothesis that 
shirking does not occur. This stresses the importance of testing using multiple 
different performance measures in analysis.  
  It is frustrating that Krautmann does extensive research in multiple different 
ideas that are prevalent in sports economics issues without combining them into a 
model that encompasses multiple factors. He simply does his best to isolate certain 
effects, and he does not connect his articles in order to gain any conclude-able or 
useful findings. 
 Another article, this one by Maxcy et al. (2002) postulates that both ex ante 
strategic behavior and ex post opportunistic shirking behavior both take place in 
Major League Baseball. Therefore, they run a regression testing the performance of 
players who are in close proximity to a new contract, either about to signed, or just 
having been signed. They use a control for the average performance of the player 
three years prior as a proxy for expected performance, then compare that to the 
performance either just before or just after a contract was signed (Maxcy et al., 
2002). The performance metric used was slugging average for hitters and strikeout 
to walk ratio for pitchers. Obviously, these differing measurements mean that the 
pitchers and hitters must be compared separately. They also use a dummy variable 
for both the first and last year in the contract, which I found to be very interesting, 
since it allows them to isolate the effects of the two most extreme years for both 
opportunistic behavior strategic maximal effort behavior. The study found evidence 
of ex ante opportunistic behavior, by finding that time spent on the Disabled List 
and playing time is significantly higher immediately preceding contract negotiations 
(Maxcy et al., 2002). They were unable to find any evidence that performance was 
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higher before a new contract, or lower after a new contract for either pitchers or 
hitters. 
An economist by the name of Katie Stankiewicz (2009) takes on a different 
approach. Stankiewicz (2009) decided to compare the production players under 
multiyear contracts and one-year contracts in order to show that players on one-
year contracts are more productive than those with multiple year contracts 
(Stankewicz, 2009). This is problematic in that players with long-term contracts are 
inherently better players, as teams will only be willing to commit multiple years to a 
player if that player is a well above-average player. Her model is very simply and 
only has controls for age, games played, and coach’s success, the latter of which is 
largely inconsequential in the world of baseball. She made no attempt to control for 
the talent of the players involved. Unsurprisingly, she found that players with long-
term contracts out-performed those on one-year contracts, meaning that the sign of 
her one-year contract was negative instead of the positive sign that she expected 
(Stankewicz, 2009).  
 Stankewicz also expanded upon this paper by looking at average productivity 
of players with four-year contracts in each individual year of the contract. This 
means that she averaged all sample players’ performance in the first year of the 
contract, the second year, etc., even including the year right before the contract was 
signed (Stankewicz, 2009). She concluded that since average performance did not 
increase in year four, then shirking could not be shown to have taken place. This is 
problematic for many reasons, the largest of which being that she did not use any 
controls, not even for age. Since players can only enter free agency once they have 
six years of major league experience, players are often on the second half of their 
career and declining by the time these long-term contracts are signed, so age would 
be expected to have a negative sign.  
 One thing that Stankewicz did do that was interesting is that she used a 
sabermetric statistic EqA as her performance variable, which is shorthand for 
equivalent average per out. This statistic adjusts performance for variables such as 
home ballpark of the player and level of pitching that the player faced against. The 
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statistic also includes base-running value, which is often ignored in the literature, 
for example by OPS, adjusted OPS, and slugging average. 
 The glaring, overarching theme in the literature regarding shirking behavior 
in Major League Baseball is that economists disagree about whether it is provable. 
Some believe that the evidence of shirking is sufficient to prove the relationship 
between contract length and effort exists in the way that the shirking hypothesis 
expects, while others are unconvinced. The models that have been created are often 
very susceptible to minor changes, as these minor changes can drastically alter the 
conclusions that the model makes. These changes can be either controls or 
statistical measures used to aggregate performance. 
Another problem with the existing literature is that all of the studies look 
exclusively at hitters, while almost none consider pitchers. Pitchers play 
considerably less games than hitters do, but it is incredibly difficult for pitchers to 
keep themselves sufficiently healthy and strong to compete at the Major League 
level. This is due to the repeated torque that a starting pitcher puts on his arm over 
the course of a season. This is not to say that it is easier for hitters to sustain 
themselves than it is for pitchers, but ignoring half of the game when it comes to 
shirking behavior seems to be an oversight.  
 They also rarely account for other incentive forces that are compelling 
players to not shirk. The more sophisticated models have been able to find evidence 
of shirking, at least in certain performance measures. Surprisingly, all of these 
articles, despite having been written in the twenty-first century, used statistical 
measures for performance that would be considered archaic strategies for 
aggregating production. There are numerous sabermetric statistics that are far more 
generally accepted nowadays in their goal of aggregating player value than slugging 
average or OPS. The only measures that were at all modern were the marginal 
revenue product estimate in Krautmann and Donley (2009), and the equivalent 
average technique used in the Stankewicz (2009) article. None used wins above 
replacement (which is similar to the marginal revenue product estimate), which was 
shocking due to its prevalence in sports media coverage of players. It is widely cited 
by MVP voters as a driving reason behind voters’ decision making. 
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 Also, there is no mention as to how the models account for various types of 
options that are often in MLB contracts. These options include player, team, mutual, 
and vesting options. Player options are also called opt-outs, so player’s can sign 
contracts in which before a certain year in the contract, they can choose to not 
exercise the rest of the contract and become free agents. Team options are the same 
except the team can nullify the contract. In mutual options, both parties must agree 
to the terms or else the player becomes a free agent. In vesting option, the player 
will become a free agent unless they have reached a certain threshold; these options 
are by far the least common of the four. 
 Since the model about to be discussed also attempts to control for player 
confidence, it is important to outline past research that has been conducted 
regarding confidence. Feltz (1988) outlined the major frameworks that sports 
economists have used to study confidence. 
 The first theoretical approach to studying self-confidence in sports is through 
self-efficacy. Bandura’s theory of self-efficacy refers to the judgments of what an 
individual can do with the skills he or she possesses, and this directly impacts the 
effort and conviction one has to successfully executive a behavior required to 
produce a desired outcome (Feltz, 1988). This is the exact type of effort that I want 
to be able to control for in my model. Expectation of person efficacy come from four 
sources, personal accomplishments, vicarious experiences, verbal persuasion, and 
physical arousal, and performance accomplishments are the most dependable 
source of information to determine an individuals self-efficacy (Feltz, 1988). 
However, it should be mentioned that this brings validity to Stankewicz’ (2009) 
control of coach’s success in her model, despite it not being the most effective way 
to determine an individual player’s confidence. 
 It is also important to look at other sports, when discussing shirking behavior 
in professional sports. The National Football League has a slightly different labor 
market, as the contracts are much more incentive based than in Major League 
Baseball. Marks (2017) created a model in which he looked at all NFL players in the 
same sample, including different positions with dummy variables to characterize 
them. He found that players with new, long-term contracts performed worse on a 
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sabermetric point scale created by Pro Football Focus, but not to a statistically 
significant degree. This model sets the precedent that it is highly difficult to compare 
players amongst different positions in the same sport. He did not run any 
regressions only using players of a certain position, giving himself a larger sample 
than just the 2015 season. Like most models looking at shirking behavior, Marks 
(2017) used age and age-squared as variables of controls. He also used the 
performance in the previous year as a basis for comparison for his model. He 
compared players’ performance to their performance the previous year, citing the 
difference between these two values as his dependent variable. Like other models, 
Marks (2017) focuses on whether or not the player had just signed a new, long-term 
contract. 
 Shirking is also extensively studied in European soccer. The journal article, 
Feess et al. (2010) assesses the effectiveness of long-term contracts as incentives, 
much like all of the other relevant articles, except this one looks at the Bundesliga, 
the top tier soccer league in Germany. Much like my own data, this article collected 
its information by hand, from a magazine in this case. Also like my own models, 
Feess et al. (2010) are aware of their own selection bias in selecting their sample. 
While their issues stem from selecting only long-term contracts, mine stems from 
only considering free-agent contracts and ignoring contracts of players that are still 
under the reserve system. They also used a number of interesting controls, such as 
whether the player was on the national team, age, number of games, whether the 
previous contract was “renewed” (which cannot happen to players in my samples), 
or whether the previous contract was allowed to expire. The idea behind this is that 
a player who has had their contract renewed has earned the favor of ownership for 
some reason, whereas allowing a contract to expire can signal unfulfilled 
expectations or low talent (Feess, et al., 2010). Feess, et al. (2010) were actually able 
to find highly significant results using this framework, showing strong evidence of 
shirking associated with people who had signed long-term contracts. 
 Lastly, shirking is also studied in the National Basketbal Association (NBA). 
Jean (2010) looks at the long-term contract and ex post shirking behavior and ex 
ante opportunistic behavior, very similar to Maxcy et al. (2002) journal on baseball. 
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This just goes to show how widespread and well studied this framework is. Like 
Maxcy et al. (2002), Jean (2010) was unable to find significant results of shirking 
behavior using this framework. Jean (2010) however, does raise an important point 
that I am trying to make in his conclusion, that there may be a variety of 
confounding factors that prevent these shirking behaviors to be detectable. My 
study will attempt to control for some of these confounding factors within the 
framework. 
 
The First Model 
 For the model, the goal was to directly show a correlation between wins 
above replacement (WAR) for a player and the years left on that player’s contract 
during that season. In order to find this relationship, the sample and the controls for 
the model are of course extremely important. This next section will detail how the 
sample and controls were chosen and what they were intended to do in the model. 
 For the sample, the goal was to be as inclusive as possible. The players 
selected were those on free agent deals, and the seasons that were considered were 
the 2016 and 2017 seasons. The sample was fairly large as compared to the samples 
used in the existing literature. The information was gathered using information 
from spotrac, baseball reference, and fangraphs. I chose to leave out catchers and 
relief pitchers, as these players play significantly less than other position players 
and starting pitchers, even when healthy. They likely could have been included 
without significantly impacting results, but I chose to leave them out due to the fact 
that they do play and contribute less. Leaving these players out posed no risk for the 
results of the paper, but I feared leaving them in the model would cause distribution 
of the WAR statistic to be too heavily concentrated around zero, leading to strong 
heteroskedasticity. That said, I was able to use nearly all of the players on veteran 
contracts for the model that were neither catchers nor relief pitchers. There are a 
few missing due to difficulty in acquiring certain contract data, which necessitated 
that I pay for the data. Also, I left out players whose contracts were comprised 
almost entirely or entirely of option years, such as the case of David Price’s contract 
with the Red Sox and Clayton Kershaw’s contract with the Dodgers. I ended up with 
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188 observations in total, which is more than sufficient based on the sample sizes of 
the existing literature. 
 Also, instead of using a SHIRK variable that represents the disparity between 
actual performance and expected performance, this model simply looks at the 
relationship between the years remaining on the contract and a performance 
measure. This is where it becomes important to control for motivational factors and 
talent, which is the biggest challenge taken on by this model, and these controls will 
be discussed in detail in a moment. The goal was to keep the framework as simple 
and easy to analyze as possible, while also planning on acquiring robust results. 
 Here is what my initial regression equation came out to: 
 
WARi=0i+1iADJGAMES+2iYRSLEFT+3iLOGSALARY+4iLOGTMONEY+ 
5iPREVREC+6iRECORD+6iLASTYEAR+7iAGE+8iAGE2+9iIMPROVE 
 
 The performance measure used in the initial model is different from those in 
other models. I chose WAR (using the fangraphs definition, specifically) as the 
performance measure for multiple reasons. WAR estimates the number of wins that 
the player contributed over the course of a season compared to a replacement level 
player for that season. First, WAR takes into account performance of all aspects of 
the game, including base-running, fielding, and hitting for positions players, and 
pitching and fielding for pitchers. It even adjusts what performance level 
characterizes a replacement level player year by year, accounting for the evolution 
of the average replacement level player as the years go on. Since this study only uses 
2016 and 2017 statistics, it is unlikely that this benefit is going to make any 
difference. Nonetheless, it provides a very complete aggregation of a player’s 
performance. Other studies often use measure like batting average, slugging 
percentage, or on-base percentage plus slugging percentage. These measures only 
look at hitting, ignoring fielding and base running, which are two very important 
components of a player’s contribution to the game. This is the only piece in the 
literature that uses WAR as its performance measure. WAR also controls for other 
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factors, such as the home ballpark factor, which is important since the dimensions 
and altitude of the ballpark contribute to the player’s production and players play 
half of their games at their home ballpark. EqA, used by Stankewicz (2009), also 
takes into account a lot of these same variables, so this article uses a similarly 
modern performance statistic. Her measure did not include defense, however, only 
offense. The ballpark controls are important because a ball in Denver, Colorado 
simply goes farther than it will in other ballparks due to thinner air at extreme 
altitude. Therefore, players on the Colorado Rockies will have statistics that are 
biased upwards since half of their games were in Coors Field. WAR takes a hitter-
friendly or pitcher-friendly environment into account on both the hitter side of 
things and the pitcher. There are endless examples like this one that allow for more 
advanced, comprehensive player comparison using WAR. WAR also allows us to 
include pitchers in the model, which is an important differentiator of the model, 
since pitchers are essentially the other half of the game and are completely lacking 
from the literature on shirking behavior. 
 The other most important variable is the number of years remaining on the 
player’s contract, YEARSLEFT. These were collected on spotrac.com, which is a good 
resource for acquiring contract information in many sports. Similar variables were 
used in all of the models in the literature review in one step or another, although 
this regression is done in one step. The years left variable is very simply the total 
number of years in the contract minus the number of completed seasons on the 
contract, not including player option seasons, team option seasons, mutual option, 
and vesting option seasons. Other models did not say how they treated these 
seasons, but I chose to omit them entirely. These options may present an issue in the 
model, as they present a whole host of different relationship dynamics between the 
player and team that may affect the player’s effort decisions depending on the 
player’s perception of the salary in the option. Meaning, if a player has the right to 
opt out of a contract but feels that they are being overpaid, then they may have 
similar behavior to a player that has many years left on the contract, but a player 
with a player option in which they believe the salary to be too low, then they may 
behave as though they are in a contract year. It may have been conceivably possible 
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to determine a probability that certain options would be exercised, and so these 
years could be considered in the model, but this model does not do so. Such an 
adjustment would be similar to the Krautmann and Donley (2009) retirement 
probability metric that they used instead of an ex post retirement variable.  
  The next variable is adjusted games played, ADJGAMES. The variable is there 
in order to control for players that missed games over the course of the season, 
which is usually due to injury or personal family emergencies. Adjusted games 
played is simply games played for position players. For starting pitchers, I 
multiplied games started by five, since starting pitchers pitch every five games for 
the most part. There are a few pitchers who got extra starts due to timely off-days in 
the team’s schedule, but having a few adjusted games played numbers as higher 
than the 162 game season is unlikely to create any significant problems for the 
model. It is also possible that a hitter can play more innings than the amount of 
games they played times 9 due to extra innings, which are the baseball equivalent to 
overtime, so this more or less evens out due to this aspect of the game.  
 I also felt it necessary to control for the player’s SALARY for the season. Since 
the player’s in this study vary greatly in their overall production, there needs to be a 
way to control for how talented the player is. Since salary is determined by past 
production, we can assume that players with higher salaries have higher expected 
performance, so this variable attempts to put players on even ground. This may be 
problematic in that players with higher salaries have more incentive to shirk, as 
players who are not being paid as much of an astronomical sum may need to earn 
further contracts in the future in order to retire comfortably, since players likely 
have the goal to live out the rest of their lives without again entering the workforce, 
and professional athletes retire at a far earlier age than nearly all other professions. 
 Also, the initial model has a dummy variable that equals one if the player 
retires after the season, LASTYEAR. These players do not have the incentive to earn 
their next contract, since they are not going to be playing the next year. It would 
have been ideal to have a variable for retirement probability as in the model from 
Krautmann and Solow (2009) but for the purposes of this study, the ex post dummy 
variable is likely sufficient. 
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 The model also controls for the team’s record in both the season before and 
the season itself, PREVREC and RECORD. The record from the season before is used 
in order to adjust for the team’s confidence going into the season. Presumably, 
teams that were good the previous year will feel confidence in their ability to 
improve and to ultimately compete for a title. Thus, a higher record will result in 
higher production. Record from the season itself works similarly, but it also 
accounts for how the team has changed since the previous year. Controls for 
extrinsic motivation are key here, extrinsic motivation is a key force opposing the 
lack of motivation associated with shirking. 
 Similar to other studies, this one also controls for AGE and AGE2. As players 
get older their performance diminishes, so these variables control for these effects. 
AGE2 is important since the relationship between age and performance is quadratic. 
As a player ages, they will improve for a time until they reach peak performance, 
also known as the player’s prime, then they will regress after this point as they age 
and gradually lose their physical tools. 
 The regression also controls for talent with salary and total money 
committed to the player, LOGSALARY and LOGTMONEY. Players with more money 
committed and higher salaries are historically better player, so one would assume 
that higher salaries produce more. It is extremely important to control for talent 
because the study is not concerning fluctuations in performance over time, rather it 
tests for indicators of performance that are consistent between a wide variety of 
players. I took the log of salary and the log of total money committed so that the 
coefficients would represent the change in performance based on a percent increase 
in salary and money earned. This is more appropriate because the incremental value 
of a dollar is negligible and much more difficult to read as a miniscule coefficient. 
Since Stankewicz (2009) found that players with longer term contracts 
perform better on the whole than players on one-year contracts and Krautmann and 
Oppenheiemr (2002) found that players with longer contracts generally have higher 
salaries, it can be inferred that higher salaries and higher total money can be 
associated with higher talent levels. Obviously, this is only true amongst players that 
have already hit free agency, since players that have not yet hit free agency are paid 
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far less than they are worth if they have superstar level talent. This is not a problem 
in this study, since we only consider players veteran players that have been able to 
negotiate their contracts after establishing their talent. 
 The last variable is a variable that accounts for the player’s individual 
confidence level and overall career trend called IMPROVE. The variable is a dummy 
that equals one if the player’s WAR in the season preceding the observation is higher 
than their average WAR. This is a key variable in the model, since we are trying to 
control for other types of motivation for a player in order to isolate the effects on 
motivation and effort of the amount of years left on the contract. I have chosen to 
focus the confidence measure on self-efficacy, since it can be most easily measured 
by making this comparison between past performance and average performance. It 
is also easiest to measure, since it is largely based on past performance. Some may 
argue that this value will almost always be negative if a player got injured the 
previous year, and thus the player did not really underperform in that year. 
However, I think this circumstance makes sense in the framework, as players may 
not trust their bodies as much, particularly the part that was injured, in the season 
following an injury. This player may not lose confidence in their abilities, exactly, 
but they still may lose confidence in their bodies’ ability to maintain when exerting 
maximal effort. This would cause them to be cautious about exerting maximum 
effort. 
 
Analysis of the First Model 
 Despite these controls, the model did not find the relationship between years 
left on the contract and the performance of the player that was expected. In fact, the 
years left on the contract variable had a positive sign, which was significant at the 
one-percent level, which was not at all expected and is extremely perplexing. This 
could be due to a variety of factors to be discussed in this section. 
 Surprisingly, neither of the logs of salary nor total money committed were 
statistically significant. This suggests that this variable did not do what it was set out 
to do, which was to control for player talent. Obviously, a player with more talent is 
expected to outperform a player with inferior talent. The only things that would 
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explain a player with more talent having lower productivity are that they played 
fewer games, yet there was not a lot of variation in this variable in the model, they 
were shirking, which there was no evidence of based on the model, on the contrary, 
there is evidence of the opposite, or if the player had begun to regress, yet we find 
that age and age-squared both had insignificant results. The total money coefficient 
even had a negative sign, suggesting that this relationship flat out does not exist, yet 
no conclusions can be drawn due to a lack of significant results. Other studies did 
not need to control for talent, but this study clearly does, as it does not create a shirk 
variable based on the difference between expected and realized production. 
It also needs a talent control because there are so few restrictions on the 
sample size. Just because a player has no remaining years on his contract of course 
does not mean that they are going to outperform the very finest players in baseball 
who just so happen to have more years left on their contract. There needs to be an 
effective control that can account for this talent differential, so that we can observe 
the isolated effect of the amount of years remaining on the contract. Having more 
years left on the contract certainly would not increase a player’s performance, but 
since the model fails to control for talent differentials between players on long-term 
and short-term contracts, we observe this positive sign. This leads me to believe that 
it would be prudent to scrap these variables and to find one that better controls for 
player talent. It is clear that salary and guaranteed money will not work, so 
something based on past production seems to be a better idea. 
The finding that total guaranteed money and salary are not effective controls 
for talent is surprising. Maxcy (2004) determined that not only do superior players 
get longer contracts, but also bigger salaries. Therefore higher salaries and more 
guaranteed money would presumably be correlated with talent and performance, 
yet this is not found to be the case in this study. Krautmann and Oppenheimer 
(2002) can explain this phenomenon with their empirical conclusion that contract 
length and return on performance are inversely related. This suggests a trade off 
that occurs, in which players are willing to accept less money for their performance 
when negotiating a long-term deal (Krautmann and Oppenheimer, 2002). Meaning, 
if a player’s performance is held constant, they will receive more money per year on 
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a short-term deal than on a long-term deal. I may have created a bias in my own 
model here. If players with high salaries also have longer term contracts, and are 
thus more likely to have more years left on their contracts, then those players may 
be more likely to shirk as a whole, biasing the entire talent control downwards. 
 AGE and AGE2 were also surprisingly insignificant. This could be due to a 
fairly small sample size. Many players in the sample were able to produce for a 
longer time than most players do. At the same time, there were many players who 
regressed in their early thirties. This is not to say that any specific player improved 
as they aged deep into his thirties, but rather that some players started to regress 
earlier than others. Since there is no set age where players will start to regress, we 
observe insignificant results. If the model used a data set with a thousand or more 
players, then the significance level would likely rise. Despite the insignificant p-
value, the age variable should remain in the model, if for no other reason, because it 
is a pervasive variable in the literature on shirking behavior. It is possible that this 
variable is insignificant because pitchers and hitters begin to regress at different 
times. Pitchers may regress earlier on the whole than hitters, so hitters with higher 
ages and WAR values may be skewing the results. Also, it makes sense that the 
coefficients of the two AGE variables are negative, since all of the players in the 
study have all hit the free agency market already. This means that they have six 
years of experience in Major League Baseball already. Therefore, we would not 
expect them to continue to improve, since they have likely already hit their prime. 
 ADJGAMES had a coefficient that was highly significant and positive, so this 
variable likely did the job of controlling for the amount of time on the field during 
the course of the season. This is encouraging, since this is the only model to include 
both pitchers and hitters in the same model, and controlling for the amount of time 
on the field is pivotally important in models trying to explain performance with 
counting statistics.  
 The IMPROVE dummy variable proved to be significant and positive, as 
expected. This can be interpreted as the confidence from the strong previous year 
carried into the next season and caused helped that player continue upon their 
above-average performance. This suggests that the self-efficacy control that I 
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created based on the analysis of Bandura’s self-efficacy theory found in Feltz (2002) 
turned out to be effective, which is a major victory for the model. More research 
should be done regarding self-efficacy as a driver for productivity, especially so in 
order to find even better controls for intrinsic motivation to be used in studies such 
as this one.  
 I also conducted robustness checks in the model. Multicollinearity was a 
slight issue between LOGSALARY and LOGTMONEY, but neither vif score exceeded 
five, so the problem was not significant enough to fear a significant skewing of 
results. Consult Table 2 to see the vif results from STATA.  Heteroskedasticity was a 
more significant issue, as the chi2 value was significant on a one-percent level. Based 
on the other models that I ran for this thesis, I postulate that this heteroskedasticity 
had something to do with the performance measure, WAR. I am not entirely sure 
why this is, but both of my regressions using WAR had this issue, while the one I did 
using OPS did not have this issue whatsoever.  
My study is far more general than the other studies. What I mean by this is 
that the study does not look at any specific circumstance, like at players who just 
signed a new contract or players who are about to hit free agency. Rather, the study 
simply looks at all players who have hit free agency and how their performance is 
effected by how many years they have remaining on their contract. For this reason, 
this study requires some creative controls that have not been tested before to my 
knowledge. Unfortunately, the existing published literature does not go into detail 
about what their vectors of controls entail, they just simply state that they used 
vectors of controls in the model.  
 I would feel more confident in asserting that years left remaining on the 
contract and production do not have an inverse relationship if there were far more 
data points, despite the fact that the p-value is significant at a one-percent level. 
Also, some of the variables have the unanticipated sign, suggesting that they fail to 
control for the phenomenon that they are intended to control for. The previous 
record variable, for example, actually has a negative sign. One would expect that a 
stronger previous record would have the effect of improving morale of the team, 
thus improving performance. However, there are arguments that would suggest that 
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this sign makes perfect sense. Perhaps a strong record the previous year could 
provoke complacency in players, for example. This argument is very basic and not 
fleshed-out enough to really satisfy me, however. Also, the negative coefficient on 
PREVREC is not statistically significant, so this is likely just a statistical fluke.  
 All imperfections of the model aside, it is also entirely possible that the 
relationship between years left on the contract and a player’s performance really is 
insignificant, since there is a lot of disagreement regarding previous results. Perhaps 
players simply shirk when they sign a lucrative new contract, as was suggested by 
Scoggins’ (1993) response to Krautmann (1990), and therefore players with high 
salaries do not perform statistically significantly better than players who are not 
paid as much. Perhaps Krautmann and Solow (2009) found that players in their 
walk years outperformed those not in their walk years, but only because of a 
different phenomenon than consciously shirking. Perhaps players are able to push 
themselves into unsustainable production when they know that it counts the most, 
similar to a mother lifting a car off a child when she knows she has to. The mother 
cannot sustain the amazing strength, but it can be achieved for a relatively short 
period of time. Really, there is no strong evidence that a player begins to work 
harder as they near the end of their contract, which would need to be the case in 
order for my model to find statistically significant results.  
 While this model did not yield the results that were expected, I did learn a lot 
from this model based on what I did wrong. Also, the model contributes to the 
literature in that it introduces the idea of controlling for factors that are inherently 
difficult to control for, such as intrinsic and team motivation levels. Such work will 
hopefully spark others to search for more effective controls in these respects. Since I 
do not have the confidence to conclude that shirking does not exist, I took it upon 
myself to try to improve the model and to find better controls in order to find this 
relationship. 
 
The Second Model 
 In order to improve upon the model, I made a minor adjustment to the 
aforementioned regression. Unfortunately, it is evident that the logs of salary and 
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total money were unable to control for player talent. If they were, then we would be 
able to observe positive and significant results, which is not the case. In fact, we can 
observe in the first table of results that the log of total money actually had a negative 
coefficient. The adjustment was to replace these two variables with an average WAR 
variable. Average WAR would in theory be able to control for the talent exhibited by 
the player over the course of their contract. 
The second model is as follows: 
WARi=0+1iADJGAMES+2iYRSLEFT+3iAVGWAR+4iIMPROVE+5iRECORD+ 
5iPREVREC+6iLASTYEAR+7iAGE+8iAGE2 
 Refer to Table 4 for complete results. Note that the only difference here is the 
omission of the log of salary and the log of total money variables. 
The model revealed positive and significant results to a one-percent 
significance level for the new control, AVGWAR (average WAR), which was 
encouraging. However, the model again fails to garner a negative sign for the 
YRSLEFT variable, which was highly disappointing, but not totally unexpected. It 
seems that even when we have an effective variable of performance, we are unable 
to find the results that we expect. 
 The with problem average WAR is that it could be skewed downward due to 
missed time on the field. If a player spends a significant amount of time on the 
Disabled List, then they are very likely to have a low WAR value for that season. This 
contrasts with statistics like OPS, where this is not a problem. In fact, OPS could be 
far too high or low than is representative of the player, since the sample size is so 
low and thus the variability is much higher than statistics usually are. WAR per 
game or WAR per plate appearance would have been better, but I did not consider 
this until time ran too thin. 
 
The Third and Final Model 
 After the results still did not come out in a way consistent with the literature, 
it became evident that I needed to change my performance variable to a more 
conventional metric used in the literature. There were also considerable 
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heteroskedasticity problems in these first two models including WAR, see Table 2 
and Table 5 for the chi2 values and significance levels. I landed on OPS, which I think 
is a more complete representation of value than slugging average, which was also 
taken under strong consideration. OPS refers to slugging average added to on base 
percentage, which I think is better than simply slugging average because walks are 
so important in the game of baseball, and they reflect advanced abilities of the 
hitters to tell balls from strikes. Slugging average of course encompasses a hitter’s 
ability to get extra base hits, also known as power. It was time to go back to basics, 
as the WAR variable did not yield expected results, so I wanted to see if the model’s 
significance levels would change like Krautmann’s (1990) did when Scoggins (1993) 
changed the performance metric. I ended up with this equation: 
 
OPSi=0+1iGames+2iYrsleft+3iCops+4iConfidence+5iRecord+5iPrevrec+ 
6iLastYear+7iAge+8iAge2 
 
 Since I am now using a hitting statistic, OPS, I had to drop all of the pitchers 
from my sample, leaving me with a still sufficient 102 observations. It was not 
possible to compare the batters’ OPS with the pitchers’ opposing OPS, since a high 
OPS would be considered good performance for a hitter and a bad performance for a 
pitcher. COPS (career OPS) replaces AVGWAR. CONFIDENCE is much the same as 
IMPROVE in the previous regressions in that CONFIDENCE equals zero if the 
previous year’s OPS is lower than their career average, and it is one if the OPS in the 
previous year was higher than their career average. This controls for self-confidence 
in much the same way as IMPROVE.  
 OPS unfortunately had the same heteroskedasticity issues that the WAR 
model had; see Table 8 for the results of the test. Luckily, heteroskedasticity does 
not bias the results, so any incorrect signs cannot be attributed to this issue with the 
error terms being correlated with a variable. Multicollinearity was not an issue 
whatsoever, and this can be confirmed in Table 9.  
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 Unfortunately, only two of the variables had statistically significant results in 
the final model, COPS and RECORD. They had the positive signs that were 
anticipated. One other positive from this model was that the YEARSLEFT variable 
had a negative coefficient. It was extremely small and insignificant, but it was the 
only “correct” or expected negative coefficient that I was able to achieve in any of 
the models. 
 
Conclusion 
This study was unfortunately unable to provide statistically significant 
evidence of shirking behavior in Major League Baseball. This is likely due to my lack 
of information regarding what is standard in the literature when it comes to vectors 
of controls. It also may have been due with the WAR statistic in some fashion, but 
there must be a way to find the shirking relationship (if it really exists, there is no 
consensus on this matter) with WAR as the performance measure. WAR is widely 
regarded as a successful, representative measure of player value of Major League 
Baseball players, so there is no reason that this measure is simply immune to the 
phenomenon. The results that I got were very frustrating, and I would welcome any 
critique regarding a more apt way to find this relationship.  
These models also raise some interesting questions, for example, how player 
options and team options affect a player’s performance. It would be fascinating to 
have a dummy variable for if the player was over or underpaid, going into the option 
year and how that affects performance and likelihood that the player’s option would 
be picked up. A player who believes himself to be underpaid during an option 
season would perceive themselves to essentially be in a contract season, whereas 
someone who perceives themselves to be overpaid in an option season in which 
they retain control of the option would be essentially the same as a long-term 
contract. Proving this empirically would be quite interesting. This would be 
relatively easy to do, as many different models have estimated the value of wins, so 
one can compare this number to their WAR and salary to create a dummy variable 
for the player is overpaid or underpaid. 
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More research needs to be done regarding pitchers as well. Since Marks 
(2017) was able to compare different positions in football, including comparisons 
between offensive, defensive, and special teams players in the same model, it seems 
like a logical next step to compare hitters and pitchers in baseball as well, regardless 
of their differences in skill set. Perhaps using a WAR per game played statistic would 
have been a more apt performance measure than either of the two performance 
measures used in my first two models. WAR is among the most important and most 
well cited statistics in baseball, so more work needs to be done to incorporate this 
statistic and understand its place in sports economics. It is very curious to me that 
simply changing my performance measure from WAR to OPS changed the sign of my 
years left variable. Why was I getting the wrong sign in the first place? It would have 
been interesting to have included dummy variables if it was the final year in the 
player’s contract, and the first year of the player’s contract, just like the Maxcy et al. 
(2002) paper. 
 On the positive side of this thesis, I was able to find a statistically significant 
relationship between a team’s record during that year and the performance of 
player’s on free agent deals during that year. I was also able to find a positive 
relationship between improvement over the average performance in the previous 
season and that player’s performance the following year. This self-efficacy control is 
unique, and the control variable, or perhaps a similar variable with the same idea 
behind it, could become a significant part of sports economics moving forward. 
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Appendix 
 
Key:  
*=10 percent significance level 
**=5 percent significance level 
***=1 percent significance level 
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Table 1: First Model Results 
Source SS 
  
Model 237.276249 
Residual 395.227029 
  
Total 632.503278 
  
  
war Coef. 
  
adjgames 0.02*** 
yrsleft 0.24*** 
logsalary 0.19 
logtmoney -0.08 
record 7.99*** 
prevrec -2.25 
age -0.01 
age2 -0.00 
lastyear -0.31 
improve .40 
_cons -5.24 
N 180 
R2adj .34 
 
 
Table 2: First Model Heteroskedasticty Test: Breusch-Pagan 
 
chi2(1) = 6.56** 
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Table 3: First Model Multicollinearity Test 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
logtmoney 4.91 0.21 
logsalary 3.80 0.26 
yrsleft 1.71 0.59 
prevrec 1.22 0.82 
adjgames 1.24 0.85 
record 1.17 0.86 
lastyear 1.13 0.89 
improve 1.130 0.91 
   
Mean VIF 2.15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Second Model Results 
Source SS 
  
Model 278.448392 
Residual 354.054885 
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Total 632.503278 
  
  
war Coef. 
  
adjgames 0.02*** 
yrsleft 0.09 
avgwar 0.46*** 
improve 0.50** 
record 7.97*** 
prevrec -2.37 
lastyear -0.20 
age 0.21 
age2 -0.00 
_cons -6.55 
N 180 
R2adj .41 
 
Table 5: Second Model Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance  
Variables: fitted values of war 
   
chi2(1) = 10.07*** 
 
 
Table 6: Second Model Multicollinearity Test 
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Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
yrsleft 1.42 0.70 
avgwar 1.39 0.72 
adjgames 1.21 0.82 
prevrec 1.21 0.83 
record 1.16 0.86 
lastyear 1.12 0.89 
improve 1.11 0.90 
   
Mean VIF 1.23  
 
 
 
Table 7: Third Model Results 
ops Coef. 
  
cops 0.81*** 
age2 0.00 
age -0.05 
yrsleft -0.00 
record 0.34** 
prevrec -0.12 
lastyear -0.01 
confidence 0.01 
_cons 1.06 
N 102 
R2adj .30 
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Table 8: Third Model Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan 
chi2(1) = 7.00*** 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Third Model Multicollinearity Test 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
   
yrsleft 1.31 0.76 
cops 1.28 0.78 
prevrec 1.2 0.83 
record 1.16 0.87 
lastyear 1.13 0.89 
confidence 1.07 0.93 
   
Mean VIF 1.19  
 
